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FREE TO BE YOU AND ME?  
COPYRIGHT AND CONSTRAINT 
Rebecca Tushnet∗ 
Joseph P. Fishman’s Creating Around Copyright advances a pro-
vocative thesis: some restrictions on creativity can spur the develop-
ment of additional creative solutions, and (some level of) copyright 
might be one of those restrictions.1  If Picasso was right that “ forcing 
yourself to use restricted means is the sort of restraint that liberates in-
vention,”2 then being forced by law to use restricted means might do 
the same thing, ultimately leading to more varied and thus more valu-
able works.3 
At the outset, it’s important to know the baseline against which we 
ought to evaluate Fishman’s claims.  Most copyright restrictionists, of 
whom I count myself one, don’t want to eliminate all copyright law.4  
Fishman’s argument is directed at creators who want to take an exist-
ing work and do something with it — incorporate parts of it into a 
new creative work or make a derivative work based on it.  Because 
the question is the proper scope of copyright as applied to these works, 
the comparison should not be to a world without copyright, but should 
instead focus on the marginal effects of expanding or contracting copy-
right’s definitions of substantial similarity and derivative works.  Once 
the question is properly framed, I have concerns about the major anal-
ogies Fishman uses — patent law and experimental evidence about 
other types of constraints on creativity — as well as his model of the 
rational creator. 
PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, AND PROGRESS 
Fishman analogizes to patents5 and applies to copyright a rationale 
often given for exclusive patent rights — that they encourage innova-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.  Thanks to Glynn Lunney and Jessi-
ca Silbey for comments. 
 1 Joseph P. Fishman, Creating Around Copyright, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1333 (2015). 
 2 FRANÇOISE GILOT & CARLTON LAKE, LIFE WITH PICASSO 57 (1964) (emphasis added). 
 3 Fishman does distinguish between invented or chosen constraints and imposed constraints 
like law: he concedes that, all things being equal, invented and chosen will be better, but argues 
that externally imposed constraints can work, too.  Fishman, supra note 1, at 1373–76.  
 4 Cf. id. at 1335, 1369–70 (suggesting that Fishman is evaluating “copyright” versus “no cop-
yright”).  
 5 Except when he concludes that patents aren’t a good model.  See id. at 1399–400 (rejecting 
patent’s treatment of independent creation, while relying on creativity literature that doesn’t dis-
tinguish between copyrightable and patentable subject matter); id. at 1394–96 (rejecting blocking 
copyrights as too risky for creativity despite the existence of blocking patents).  
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tion not only by rewarding patentees but also by giving people who 
can’t get a license from the patentee, or don’t want to pay for that li-
cense, incentives to design around patents.  However, while innovation 
in copyright shares features with innovation in patent, it has marked 
differences as well.  Doctrinally, unlike patent, copyright protects ex-
pression and not ideas.  Why allow free riding on ideas but not on ex-
pression?  Constraint theory can’t tell us. 
Perhaps even more significantly, “designing around” requires a de-
liberateness about the law that isn’t common in many copyright sec-
tors, though it may occur with large copyright exploiters.  Relatedly, 
Jeanne Fromer has drawn on the empirical creativity literature to 
identify “problem finding” as a vital driver of copyrightable creativity 
(how do I express the alienation of my generation?), whereas “problem 
solving,” where the contours of the problem are already known (how 
do I make a fixed-wing aircraft more fuel efficient?), is more repre-
sentative of patentable creativity.6  Where problem finding is more 
important, constraints outside the artistic process may be especially 
detrimental. 
In addition, in both of the alternatives to inventing around — li-
censing or infringing — the person who isn’t inventing around may 
just be copying the patented device or process, not generating patenta-
ble subject matter.  By contrast, creating a derivative work — author-
ized or not — also requires the addition of creativity.  Tom Stoppard’s 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead (based on Hamlet) involves 
creative effort, as does Stoppard’s Arcadia (based on history).  It’s not 
evident that the nonderivative work requires “more” creativity or is 
“better” at giving us the new expression copyright aims to incentivize, 
because “derivative” and “lots of variation” are not really opposites. 
Consider also how we think about performances of cover songs; 
although the cover song is copied, it is also altered, and often the alter-
ation gains meaning from being put in dialogue with other versions.  It 
is hard to see how to analogize that kind of cultural conversation with 
patent improvements.  Meanwhile, six of the top country songs of 2014 
sound almost exactly alike, apparently not as a result of infringement 
but based on multiple singers’ understanding of what sells.7  In copy-
right, there can be a lot of sameness without infringement and a lot of 
copying without sameness. 
The role of iterative creativity in copyright is related to an im-
portant difference between “progress” in patentable subject matter 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 6 See Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 
1444 (2010). 
 7 Michelle Geslani, This Video Proves Every Hit Country Song Sounds the Same, 
CONSEQUENCE OF SOUND (Jan. 9, 2015, 11:20 AM), http://consequenceofsound.net/2015/01/this 
-video-proves-every-hit-country-song-sounds-the-same [http://perma.cc/X8ZK-YNTA]. 
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and “progress” in copyright.  As Barton Beebe and others have noted, 
what constitutes progress in utilitarian fields is often relatively clear 
compared to progress in art.8  Very few of us would choose to ride in a 
Model T for anything other than novelty value.  We prefer cars with 
seatbelts, airbags, and powerful acceleration.  What constitutes “pro-
gress” in copyright is much more up for grabs, and any consensus is 
likely to be fragile and generational.  As a result, anyone who doesn’t 
want to have to design around the derivative works right can easily go 
to another deep well of inspiration, one in the public domain (this is 
also relevant to the experimental evidence on which Fishman relies, 
discussed below).  If you can’t write the next Iron Man movie without 
a license, you can always write another Sherlock Holmes movie with-
out a license.9  By contrast, riffing off the Model T engine instead of a 
currently patented engine would be a trickier, and likely commercially 
unsuccessful, prospect. 
But what if you really want to write a superhero movie, not a Rob-
ert Downey Jr. movie?  In that case, copyright does indeed pose 
unique constraints.  If we accept that some artists are creatively com-
mitted to particular genres or tropes, though, it is hard to deny that 
some artists are also creatively committed to particular characters or 
works and won’t do their best work without them.  As Wendy Gordon 
insightfully observed, there are cases in which a copyrighted work has 
such a powerful influence on us that being barred from creatively re-
acting to it imposes an injury on us.10 
Moreover, even if a creator doesn’t feel compelled to work with 
specific subject matter because of her exposure to it, working with ex-
isting characters and situations is working with specific constraints, 
just as writing a sonnet is.11  Indeed, classic derivative works such as 
translations or movie versions of books inherently pose important crea-
tive constraints, because of their goal of moving from one medium or 
language to another.  Consider an account of sampling from electronic 
musician Kid606 that differs markedly from Fishman’s characteriza-
tion: “Sampling is like Legos.  If you give someone a bunch of Lego 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 8 Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Problem of Aesthetic Progress, Inaugural 
Lecture of the John M. Desmarais Professorship of Intellectual Property Law, New York Univer-
sity School of Law, (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.law.nyu.edu/news/barton-beebe-inaugural 
-desmarais-lecture [http://perma.cc/5HTJ-9VQ4]. 
 9 As long as you leave out details from the ten stories still in copyright in the United States. 
See Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 755 F.3d 496, 497 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 10 See Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in 
the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993); see also Rebecca Tushnet, 
Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 
532–33 (2009) (describing this artistic response). 
 11 See, e.g., Henry Jenkins, Why Heather Can Write, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 6, 2004), http:// 
www.technologyreview.com/news/402471/why-heather-can-write [http://perma.cc/9PZQ-JWUQ] 
(discussing the benefits for young writers of starting with familiar characters and situations). 
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blocks and tell them to put something together, then they have some-
thing to work with — as opposed to saying, ‘Here’s a bunch of plastic, 
go mold it and then build it.’”12 
Similarly, as children’s literature scholar Catherine Tosenberger 
notes, the “limitations of writing preexisting characters within an es-
tablished universe” themselves “offer opportunities to play with con-
straint” — “in order to be recognizable as such, a recursive text 
[based on an existing text] must agree to be limited by some element of 
the source material.”13 
It’s unclear why further restraints would be useful or important for 
such works, though Fishman’s argument may have more relevance for 
the bloated reproduction right, which allows copyright owners to sup-
press works in the same market niche as their own.  Moreover, legal 
constraints are likely to vary in ways unrelated to artistic aims or pro-
cesses: a rapper who signs with a major label, for example, will have 
much more freedom to sample than an independent artist, based on 
the label’s cross-licensing practices within its own properties. 
Precisely because the aims of art are up for grabs in a way that the 
aims of technological invention are generally not, constraints that come 
from law are regularly mismatched with the constraints an artist 
would otherwise choose.  With their much-vaunted reluctance to judge 
the quality of creative works, courts are not in a good position to de-
termine which constraints are useful to creators.  Even more im-
portant: courts are not in a better position to identify proper con-
straints than the artists themselves (or even the funders, whether 
nonprofit or for-profit, who bankroll artists with the hope of finding 
something artistically or economically successful).  Artists are indeed 
regularly overoptimistic about the value of their creations,14 which 
may help explain why experimental subjects overestimate their own 
creativity,15 but that doesn’t validate copyright’s limits.  Creativity is 
too varied to conclude that copyright’s constraints are useful ones, 
even if we believe that patent’s are. 
EXPERIMENTS WITH CONSTRAINTS ON CREATIVITY 
Along with the analogy to patent, Fishman also draws on experi-
mental evidence about the effects of constraints on creativity.  While 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 12 Kembrew McLeod, An Oral History of Sampling: From Turntables to Mashups, in THE 
ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO REMIX STUDIES 83, 85 (Eduardo Navas et al. eds., 2014). 
 13 Catherine Tosenberger, Mature Poets Steal: Children’s Literature and the Unpublishability 
of Fanfiction, 39 CHILD. LITERATURE ASS’N Q. 4, 13, 22 (2014). 
 14 See Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 31 (2011). 
 15 See Fishman, supra note 1, at 1365. 
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the research indicates that the nature of constraint matters,16 that very 
context-specificity limits the applicability of evidence about nonlegal 
constraints to legal regimes.  Research suggests, for example, that be-
ing given an exemplar of a solution to a problem limits subjects’ imag-
inations with respect to design problems, causing them to stick close to 
the exemplar even when it exhibits obvious flaws.17 
Two points are worth noting.  First, further studies showed nega-
tive effects of pictorial exemplars for mechanical engineering students, 
but only marginally significant effects for students in industrial and in-
terior design.18  This result is another indication that creativity is high-
ly sensitive to contextual factors, like genre and training, and that ex-
trapolations to copyright law from this evidence are risky.  Second, 
and more significantly, in the experimental condition, exemplars can 
be withheld, and thus people can be directed to create without a model 
of possible results.19  In the copyright condition, they cannot.  Only the 
legal regime can be tweaked.20  Relatedly, the research Fishman dis-
cusses involves specific tasks set by experimenters (design a rack for a 
car), not tasks chosen for intrinsic or market-based reasons. 
Moreover, Fishman’s theory of copyright constraint requires a le-
gally educated, risk-averse creator who wishes to commercialize her 
work and thus knows of and desires to respond to copyright’s con-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 16 See, e.g., id. at 1364–65 (discussing studies in which subjects were given modular compo-
nents from a presorted set of noncopyrightable elements — shapes or yarn).  Constraints on 
choice within a set of noncopyrightable elements, or limits on the size of the set, are very different 
from the constraints imposed by copyright’s substantial similarity and derivative works rules. 
 17 Id. at 1366–67 (citing David G. Jansson & Steven M. Smith, Design Fixation, 12 DESIGN 
STUD. 3 (1991)) (reporting research on the effects of pictorial examples of solutions to design prob-
lems; explicit instructions to students to avoid using the specific problematic features of the exem-
plars did not work, where problematic meant undesirable from the perspective of the functional 
design goal).  
 18 See Evangelia G. Chrysikou & Robert W. Weisberg, Following the Wrong Footsteps: Fixa-
tion Effects of Pictorial Examples in a Design Problem-Solving Task, 31 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
PSYCHOL.: LEARNING MEMORY & COGNITION 1134, 1135 (2005) (citing A. Terry Purcell & 
John S. Gero, Design and Other Types of Fixation, 17 DESIGN STUD. 363 (1996)). 
 19 See, e.g., Fishman, supra note 1, at 1396 (discussing a study in which coders were denied 
access to others’ solutions and did better than coders who were free to build off of others’ solu-
tions). 
 20 The studies differ on whether instructing people to stay away from the exemplar helps when 
designing functional devices to solve specified problems.  Id. at 1367 & n.201 (citing Chrysikou & 
Weisberg, supra note 18).  Chrysikou and Weisberg used the exact same examples, instructions, 
and tasks as Jansson and Smith, but they got conflicting results.  See Chrysikou & Weisberg, su-
pra note 18, at 1144.  This variation isn’t surprising as replication is difficult, but Chrysikou and 
Weisberg attribute their differing results to steps taken to ensure that participants carefully read 
the instructions and didn’t report on perceived ambiguities.  It’s not clear what the analogy in 
copyright would be — could we make sure that the people exposed to existing works are carefully 
educated about the derivative works right and instructed that they’re not allowed to license?  
Even if such instructions could work, instructions to avoid copying functional features are still 
not very much like copyright’s definitions of infringing similarity or derivative works. 
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straints.21  As long as copyright only protects expression, then, this 
type of creator can copy a lot.  Unlike experimental subjects, the lazy 
creator has a whole menu of possible existing works both in the public 
domain (the King Arthur mythos) and not (Outlander) that she can use 
or license if Game of Thrones is unavailable.  The make-or-buy deci-
sion, in other words, is quite different from the make-or-copy decision 
faced, at least subconsciously, in the creativity studies.  Someone will 
license a sword-and-sorcery fantasy to the profit maximizer at a price 
that at least matches the cost of creating around.22  Because progress 
in copyright doesn’t work like it does in patent, and yesterday’s stories 
can be made fresh and profitable in a way that buggy whips can’t, 
copyright’s constraints have much less effect on “inventing around.”  
Indeed, if Fishman is correct, it’s not clear why we should protect 
derivative works at all — why not send them immediately into the 
public domain?  That would provide even more economic incentive to 
design around existing works.23  But if we want (some) derivative 
works to be created because they’re creative and valuable, then we’ve 
arrived at the position that designing around is sometimes beneficial 
and not designing around is sometimes beneficial — a result which 
seems innocuous but unhelpful. 
Thus, even accepting the relevance of the creativity studies, it’s too 
simple to say that “[w]ithout a derivative work right, we may get more 
homogenization.”24  The derivative work right doesn’t protect us 
against the creation of lots of derivative works, as current experience 
with serialization and merchandising demonstrates.25  Robust licensing 
already means that new works are less different from old works than 
they would be if derivative works were banned.  Licensing also deliv-
ers more profit for already-wealthy content providers, which has its 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 21 This is probably a somewhat different set of individuals than the set of people who are in 
fact incentivized by copyright, though a good enough fit for that set.  But that’s not the full set of 
creators who are affected by copyright law, or by beliefs about that law, and if we’re judging 
copyright’s fitness for purpose we should think about those people as well. 
 22 Cf. Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 512 (7th Cir. 2002) (discussing, in the trademark con-
text, purely rational licensor’s disinterest in the content of licensed material if profit is the only 
concern). 
 23 Fishman’s reasoning could even be read to imply that derivative works should be banned, 
preventing anyone, even the initial author, from relying too heavily on an existing work.  After 
all, as author Don Marquis reportedly said, “a sequel is an admission that you’ve been reduced to 
imitating yourself.”  EDWARD ANTHONY, O RARE DON MARQUIS 487 (1962). 
 24 Fishman, supra note 1, at 1395. 
 25 See, e.g., Cecilia Kang, Hollywood’s Addiction to Franchises Is Reaching New Extremes, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/hollywoods 
- a d d i c t i o n - t o - f r a n c h i s e s - i s - r e a c h i n g - n e w - e x t r e m e s / 2 0 1 5 / 0 1 / 1 6 / 4 b 8 b c 9 3 4 - 9 6 a 9 - 1 1 e 4 - a a b d 
-d0b93ff613d5_story.html [http://perma.cc/AD3E-MKT6] (“The result, say many observers, is a 
slate of movies that endlessly recycle the same characters and franchises, to the exclusion of prac-
tically anything else. . . . And with elaborate plans for trilogies and spinoffs going into the next 
decade, the industry is counting on the fact that audiences won’t get tired of it all.”). 
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own effects on the creative ecosystem.26  In all of Fishman’s anecdotes 
related to copyright, being denied a license is what spurs creativity.  
How often that happens, versus how often a Marvel property spawns 
another Marvel property, seems at least on first inspection to favor the 
granted license.  And moves by major copyright owners to license al-
most every use — and monetize it afterwards — are only increasing. 
Quite separately, many creators aren’t legal experts subject to care-
ful calibration of the substantial similarity standard and the derivative 
works right.  Professor Jessica Silbey’s qualitative empirical work with 
creators, lawyers, and businesspeople involved in commercializing in-
tellectual property reveals that artists are usually uninformed about 
and uninterested in the details of intellectual property law.  They just 
don’t think about copyright at the point of creation.  As she explains, 
[I]ntellectual property law is largely unfelt and unseen by these interview-
ees either as a guide or as a constraint in the early development of works 
of art and science. . . . [I]ntellectual property law does not productively 
structure the beginnings of creative or inventive experience.  Instead, the 
creative or innovative impulses described by the interviewees arise from 
diverse and serendipitous personal experiences, from doing what pleases 
them, from pursuing what appears necessary and important, from the pur-
suit of personal and professional freedom, and from within communities of 
influence.27 
Other recent empirical work finds similar results across a number 
of artistic and innovative communities.  For most creators, rights talk 
and economics are at best loosely linked to formal law, which is “in-
voked or imagined occasionally, opportunistically, or instrumental-
ly,”28 more as fantasy, rumor, threat, or “a symbol of corporate power 
rather than as a specific set of rules.”29  Even when statutory and case 
law is readily available, “people actually choose to understand the law 
through information and opinion gathered from friends, strangers, 
coworkers, and the media.”30 
Silbey finds that law and legal advice often only come in at the last 
minute, after the work has been created.31  As Fishman notes, this is a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 26 See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our System of Free 
Expression, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1879, 1911–15 (2000). 
 27 JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND EVERYDAY 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 53 (2015); see also id. at 96, 100 (finding that intellectual property 
owners underenforce, are ignorant of, or misunderstand the law, particularly copyright).   
 28 LAURA J. MURRAY, S. TINA PIPER & KIRSTY ROBERTSON, PUTTING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN ITS PLACE 1 (2014). 
 29 Id. at 2. 
 30 Id. 
 31 See SILBEY, supra note 27, at 188; see also id. at 189–90 (finding that creators feel that 
lawyers make the questions too complex and offer unhelpful advice, treating everything as too 
risky); MURRAY, PIPER & ROBERTSON, supra note 28, at 2 (finding that intellectual property 
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likely unhelpful “middle” or “late constraint,”32 and one that the em-
pirical evidence suggests can’t routinely be moved forward.  Lawyers 
do help with designing around patents, but not with other parts of the 
creative process.33  Instead, Silbey concludes, creators value autonomy: 
the freedom to choose for themselves what their aims and constraints 
will be.34  This leads to my next major concern: variation in who bene-
fits from legal constraints, and who doesn’t. 
THE APPROPRIATE MODEL OF THE CREATOR 
What about creators who care more about the content of what they 
create than an indifferent profit maximizer does?  Some people enjoy 
creating alternatives to sampled music and feel their work has been 
improved by finding workarounds.35  Interestingly, however, several of 
Fishman’s examples suggest a different reaction to copyright law from 
the compliance he proposes as generative: for example, a producer 
says, “[Y]ou tend to take less obvious bits of records and obviously 
you hunt for more obscure records, or you chop something within an 
inch of its life so even you’ve forgotten what you sampled . . . The new 
cautious approach in itself becomes a limitation, but not necessarily a 
bad one.”36  But a sample’s obscurity doesn’t make it any less copied; 
it just means you’re less likely to get caught.37  This producer has tak-
en an idea of the law and used it to impose a different kind of con-
straint, which is certainly noteworthy but not very supportive of the 
idea that restraints on unlicensed sampling encourage creativity. 
Nonetheless, I readily accept that people with the resources to re-
record performance tracks in a studio, such as Kanye West,38 can con-
clude that their workarounds are better artistically than their original 
ideas.  However, as Fishman notes, additional constraints don’t work 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
claims are “adopted to cross or police boundaries long after a work has been created or an inno-
vation has taken place”). 
 32 Fishman, supra note 1, at 1388. 
 33 SILBEY, supra note 27, at 206–07. 
 34 See, e.g., id. at 248. 
 35 Fishman, supra note 1, at 1370–71. 
 36 Id. at 1371–72 (quoting Justin Morey, Copyright Management and Its Effect on the Sam-
pling Practice of UK Dance Music Publishers, 3 J. INT’L ASS’N FOR STUDY POPULAR MUSIC, 
no. 1, 2012, at 48, 59 (omission in original)); see also id. at 1371 (citing other examples of musi-
cians who hide but do not cease their copying). 
 37 The courts are, unfortunately, split on whether a completely unrecognizable sample is ac-
tionable — but all would agree that a recognizable sample, even an obscure one, is actionable 
unless the use is de minimis or fair use.  See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 
F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005); VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, No. CV 12-05967, 2013 WL 8600435 
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2013). 
 38 Fishman, supra note 1, at 1370. 
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as well for people without other resources and support.39  Plenty of 
other creators find that the inability to sample makes their works 
worse.40  Moreover, this isn’t an apples-to-apples comparison, since the 
problem is not just that some works are “worse”  (by whatever stand-
ard one cares to apply) but that some potential producers and mes 
sages leave the field.  Rap, for example, has depoliticized sampling, 
and thus the very specific historical references and allusions made pos-
sible by sampling have declined: 
[S]ampling provided an important engagement with musical and political 
history, a connection that was interrupted by Grand Upright and the cases 
after it [requiring sampling to be authorized], coinciding with a growing 
disconnect between rap music and a sense of social responsibility. 
 . . . But as Hank Shocklee, pioneering member of Public Enemy’s 
production team The Bomb Squad, told me, having open access to sam-
ples often did significantly impact artists’ lyrical content: “A lot of the 
records that were being sampled were socially conscious, socially relevant 
records, and that has a way of shaping the lyrics that you’re going to write 
in conjunction with them.”  When you take sampling out of the equation, 
Shocklee said, much of the social consciousness disappears because, as he 
put it, “artists’ lyrical reference point only lies within themselves.”41 
Likewise, works of history now “design around” copyright by only 
using government artists to represent post-1923 U.S. art, thus 
overrepresenting their role to students of history.42  The recent film 
Selma rewrote Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s speeches because the King 
family sold the rights to King’s speeches to a different filmmaker, forc-
ing distortion into a creative work of historical fiction.43 
Fishman alludes to this lumpiness in the effects of copyright con-
straints, suggesting that “we lack a fine-grained understanding of who 
is benefiting, who isn’t, and what explains the difference.”44  I disa-
gree.  Along with the copyright restrictionists who recount the kinds of 
creativity lost to overreaching copyright, especially creativity from 
younger and less wealthy classes of artists with lower tolerance for 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 39 See also MARCUS BOON, IN PRAISE OF COPYING 147 (2010) (discussing sampling’s rela-
tion to lack of access to equipment and musical instruments); Sheila Rule, Record Companies Are 
Challenging ‘Sampling’ in Rap, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1992, at C13. 
 40 See KEMBREW MCLEOD & PETER DICOLA, CREATIVE LICENSE 188 (2011). 
 41 Erik Nielson, Did the Decline of Sampling Cause the Decline of Political Hip Hop?, THE 
ATLANTIC, Sept. 2013, h t t p : / / w w w . t h e a t l a n t i c . c o m / e n t e r t a i n m e n t / a r c h i v e / 2 0 1 3 / 0 9 / d i d - t h e 
-decline-of-sampling-cause-the-decline-of-political-hip-hop/279791 [http://perma.cc/C3M4-NZFC]. 
 42 See Brief for College Art Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 7, 18, El-
dred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618). 
 43 See Jonathan Band, Can You Copyright a Dream?: How the Martin Luther King Estate 
Controls the National Hero’s Image, POLITICO MAG., Jan. 12, 2015, http://www.politico.com 
/magazine/story/2015/01/selma-martin-luther-king-can-you-copyright-a-dream-114187.html [http:// 
perma.cc/44ZN-HKCT]. 
 44 Fishman, supra note 1, at 1403. 
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risk,45 scholars focusing on race and gender have elaborated who is 
benefiting and who isn’t, and suggested reasons that aren’t founded in 
optimizing creativity.46 
Relatedly, if the goal of copyright law is to optimize differentiation, 
then we are wildly overprotecting.  The constraint/incentive model co-
vers only situations where people are trying to generate “new” works.  
But copyright protects a huge number of works that aren’t generated 
because people are trying to make money being creative, or even try-
ing to make money by using expressive works as such.  Protecting 
email, homework, product manuals, and many other kinds of copy-
righted works creates pure deadweight loss from this perspective. 
The usual copyright theory answer is that it’s not worth sorting out 
these incentive-indifferent works, especially since there might be a  
little bit of copyright-relevant motivation even in some of these catego-
ries.  That response may well be true; regardless, the nondiscrimina-
tion principle demonstrates that our calibration of rights will almost 
inevitably, for many reasons outside optimizing the number or quality 
of creative works, be chunky.  Where we can only move in large steps, 
appeals to precision of the sort that requires categorizing seven types 
of constraint may come at the expense of accuracy and fairness.47 
WHAT SHOULD WE DO NEXT? 
I welcome Fishman’s call for more empirical research.48  Nonethe-
less, uncertainty about calibration means that “[h]ow broad or narrow 
constraint scope should be to promote creativity” should not “color 
what kinds of adaptations the fair use doctrine should permit.” 49  
Even if we get more empirical evidence, it won’t correlate with results 
in litigated cases — at most, constraint theory offers a general reason 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 45 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX (2008). 
 46 See, e.g., Carys J. Craig, Reconstructing the Author-Self: Some Feminist Lessons for Copy-
right Law, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 207 (2007); K.J. Greene, Intellectual Property 
at the Intersection of Race and Gender: Lady Sings the Blues, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y 
& L. 365 (2008). 
 47 Cf. Oren Bracha & Talha Syed, Beyond the Incentive–Access Paradigm?  Product Differen-
tiation & Copyright Revisited, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1841, 1882 (2014) (“Calibrating copyright on the 
basis of the trade-offs involved along the various supramarginal and inframarginal parameters 
requires predicting a host of complex effects in multiple markets and then attempting to fine-tune 
doctrines that are not always well-suited to the task. . . . [S]uch complexity should give pause 
when it comes to embracing the theory’s prescriptive relevance, and should motivate further re-
flection on second-best, comparative considerations regarding what kinds of necessarily rough 
judgments or imprecise proxies are most plausible to distill and implement as the theory’s 
takehome lessons.” ). 
 48 See Fishman, supra note 1, at 1403. 
 49 Id. at 1385.  
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that fair use defenses should be rejected in transformative content cas-
es.  That would be a bad result.50 
I’m suspicious of claims about improving fair use doctrine through 
the use of creativity research, not just on empirical grounds but be-
cause fair use supports other values.  For example, freedom of speech 
means that you need a good reason to tell someone that they should 
express themselves in some other way, because of that person’s own 
interests in communicating.  Communicating easily, via shortcuts in-
stead of “designing around,” is often to be valued rather than dispar-
aged because it helps a speaker reach her audience.  Moreover, Fish-
man’s account of fair use is neither descriptively accurate nor 
normatively attractive: he suggests that transformativeness is a good 
standard because it encourages designing around and altering existing 
content.51  But in the current fair use system, exact copying coupled 
with transformative purpose is arguably even more likely to be fair 
than transforming content.  As a result, books can accurately illustrate 
history52 and libraries can digitize their collections for analysis and ac-
cess for those who are print disabled.53 
Other relevant areas of copyright law are equally complicated.  
While constraint theory could be used to justify expanding the deri-
vative works right or limiting compulsory licenses to record cover 
songs in the hope that we’d encourage more singers to become song-
writers as well, its marginal effects are unlikely to overwhelm other 
considerations. 
More generally, even those of us who dislike how the broad deriva-
tive works right and the substantial similarity test currently operate 
commonly think that authors should be able to license movie versions 
of their works.  We question whether law is the appropriate source of 
constraints that ought to (and do) loom large in artists’ minds, instead 
of artistic genres, audience demands, artistic integrity, economic incen-
tives, and so on.  And we also doubt that the law presently has the 
right balance, primarily because, even if some people respond well to 
legal constraints, others — especially those without resources to access 
lawyers or pay large licensing fees — respond by shutting down.  At a 
minimum, those who wish to constrain expression by pointing to the 
creativity that often emerges under censorship54 surely bear a heavy 
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 50 Cf. Bracha & Syed, supra note 47, at 1883 (“The more complex and information-demanding 
the model upon which decisions about shaping and applying the law are based, the more vulner-
able such decisions may be to manipulation by private rent-seeking efforts to tilt such decisions in 
their favor.”). 
 51 Fishman, supra note 1, at 1397. 
 52 See Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 53 See Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 54 Fishman, supra note 1, at 1378. 
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burden of proof.  The artists (not to mention the art) lost to the gulag, 
the blacklist, the closet, and the asylum deserve a presumption in fa-
vor of freedom. 
In today’s politicized context, the rhetoric of freedom — of speech, 
of thought, of artistic choice of which constraints to follow — is vitally 
important to check the automatic deference to “property” that too of-
ten dominates government treatment of copyright issues.  Neither in-
formation nor creativity wants to be free (or chained), because neither 
of those concepts wants anything.  People do.  And when copyright 
restrictionists speak of “freedom,” it’s not because we want to make 
up our own languages or breathe on the moon, awesome as that might 
be.  It’s because broad copyright produces specific winners and losers, 
and the winners are gaining too much at the expense of the losers.  If 
copyright law is about incentives for individual creators, then caring 
about how copyright doctrines distribute the benefits of copyright law 
between the haves and have nots is fundamental. 
 
 
